1. Bibliographic Entry. Space as a strategic asset
2. Author : Joan Johnson-Freese. NWC professor of some made-up department. Surely furloughed by the time of this report…
3. Context: Post-Cold War security environment
4. Scope: The Bush era space policies and second/third order effects
5. Evidence/credibility: Space related treaties, space exploration history, military doctrine
6. Central Proposition/Thesis: The United States needs a comprehensive space strategy that considers all aspects of strategic activity and the realities of the international environment.
· This book remains focused on those strategic issues related to the security dilemma created by the potential clash of global space ambitions, and how the United States can fulfill its destiny as a great, flourishing, and powerful nation without such a clash. (viii)
· PTP: The author has a lot of bitches, gripes, and complaints, but very few tangible suggestions on what to do about any of them,
· PTP: Author is quick to compare US posture in Space to European posture, stating Europe sees space as a knowledge and economic based entity whereby the US sees it as a military domain. (9) Author fails to recognize that the Europeans can afford to see space this way because they get their military space support for free from the US.
· Author takes exception that the Bush administration’s Pentagon viewed space from the perspective that it’s inevitable that it be weaponized at some point, and from this position of acceptance, started to plan accordingly. (10). Isn’t this the natural progression of history? When man has access to a new medium, he will weaponize it, and eventually he will fight in it? Clausewitz thought so.
· The ultimate American goal appears to be space dominance, the unchallengeable ability to control the space environment. (20) So what?
· PTP: Author espouses manned spaceflight as a source of soft power and something the world will look up to and respect. Uses the Apollo program as an example. Allow me to remind the author that during Apollo was the TET offensive, the Pueblo, etc. Author’s position is untenable and a gross overstatement.
· To be a space power, rather than a space services consumer, a country must be able to get to and maneuver in space. That means that until lift is easy and affordable, it will continue to be an issue. (very true. Does the advent of commercial space lift change this?)
2 .: the United States is moving toward weaponizing space for both defensive and offensive purposes, while the rest of the world considers space assets primarily as tools requisite to advance in a globalized world and is fearful of apparent u.s. intentions to arm and control the heavens, potentially shutting out other countries. (fiercely liberal view of space and the world’s perception of space. Of course other nations feel this way toward space, they benefit from making us feel this way too. They are in no position to use space in any other way, whereas we can afford to see it from a realist perspective).
4 Space weapons, I contend, are not in the best interests of the United States, at least in the near term. .. Alternative paths to protecting U.S. space assets are not being considered. (What’s wrong with weapons in space if they are solely to protect US assets? If no one attacks our assets, then they’ll never be used, right?)
7 ,Today. one might ask why space should remain a priority. such a space expedition is feasible only through government funding and sponsorship. · Second, and related, other countries are already involved in space activity, and space activity inherently carries security implications with it. It behooves the most powerful space player, the United States, to try to shape those efforts in a peaceful manner. Finally, space travel has strong futurist connotations, and it is in the best interests of the United States to be seen as the leader into a positive future. as it was during the Apollo program.
21 Ultimately, the potential for the will of the United States to become absolute is perceived as threatening to the very sovereignty of other countries
47 The U.S. government's approach to controlling sensitive technology traditionally has stemmed from asking one fundamental question: What technology should the United States attempt to control? There are two basic answers: either everything that has potential military value should be controlled, or the United States must accept that it cannot control everything and should build high fences around small areas of especially critical technology over which it retains a monopoly (such as stealth technology). If the second approach is taken, it then becomes critical to stay ahead of everyone else through R&D in uncontrolled areas. Current U.S. policy assumes the first approach, that everything with potential military value should be controlled.
56 The lesson of Apollo is simple: without a strategic purpose, manned spaceflight is not deemed sufficiently important to warrant the kind of government resource investment necessary for success.
80 Manned space activity yields benefits in the form of jobs, education, technology development, and prestige, but none of those is enough either. (so does curing cancer.)
81 As long as the u.s. manned space vision is purely about exploration, its future is uncertain. As long as its future is uncertain, so too is American leadership in manned space.
83 The four official national security space missions are space support, force enhancement, space control, and force apphcation.2
84 Unquestionably, the most important issue in the space support mission has been and remains lift. Relying on launchers that evolved from weapons systems to being the workhorses of the launcher fleet has been the basic problem. Since the launchers were developed as weapons, their primary goal was to effectively deliver a warhead payload. As a weapon in a confrontation for potential national survival against the Soviet Union, the cost of launching the warhead was, understandably, not much of a concern. But as a launcher intended to place a satellite in orbit, cost is a large consideration.
lift was considered to be broken because the average cost per pound to launch payloads into orbit was so high that nobody but governments could afford to go to space.
85 The need to move toward standardization, whereby payloads could be adapted and placed on interchangeable launchers faster and more easily, was recognized as well.
A general rule of thumb is that the heavier the payload and the higher the orbit, the more expensive the launch.
89 To be a space power, rather than a space services consumer, a country must be able to get to and maneuver in space. That means that until lift is easy and affordable, it will continue to be an issue.
91 At this point, the United States both has the highest capabilities and is the most de pendent on those capabilities. That makes protecting those assets imperative.
· Space control basically means ensuring that the United States can reap the advantages offered from space, and adversaries cannot.
The ground segment is the most vulnerable, if for no other reason than the relative ease of physical access.
92 Hardening, for example, involves protecting satellite components from harm, including from directed energy, laser, or microwave weapons, by using hard ware such as filters and shutters that cover optics. · Shielding, another protective technique, includes using metal shields and resistant paints to protect satellites from electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), generated either naturally by solar storms or by nuclear blasts or other weapons.
· Deception methods intentionally mislead adversaries about space systems. Another way is referred to as stealth and cloaking.
'. Providing backups for critical spacecraft and system components, known as redundancy and reconstitution, also decreases vulnerability.